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The First Twenty Years of the Headlee 
Amendment 
• 
KEVIN C. KENNEDY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago, after a general election held on November 7, 
1978, Michigan voters ratified an initiative petition, Proposal E, 
amending Article IX of the Michigan Constitution. l This 
constitutional amendment, popularly known as the Headlee 
Amendment, "was proposed as part of a nationwide 'taxpayer revolt' 
in which taxpayers were attempting to limit legislative expansion of 
requirements placed on local government, to put a freeze on what 
they perceived was excessive government spending, and to lower their 
taxes both at the local and state level."2 The Headlee Amendment 
added Sections 25-34 to Article IX. The following is a summary of the 
added sections. 
Article IX, Section 25 summarizes the four core provisions of the 
Headlee Amendmene 
1. Property taxes, other local taxes, state taxation, and state 
spending may not exceed the limitations of the 
Amendment, absent voter approval. 
* Professor of Law, Michigan State JJ niversity - Detroit College of Law. 
1. Article IT, § 9 of the Michigan constitution allows for modification of the 
constitution by initiative or referendum. Through either process, the voters may 
propose and adopt laws independent of the Legislature or approve or reject laws 
enacted by the Legislature. The 1978 amendments to Article IX were enacted 
through the initiative process. 
2. See Durant v. State Bd. of Educ., 381 N.W.2d 662, 667 (Mich. 1985) 
(footnote omitted). Id. 
3. Section 25 provides: 
Property taxes and other local taxes and state taxation and spending may 
not be increased above the limitations specified herein without direct voter 
approval. The state is prohibited from requiring any new or expanded 
activities by local governments without full state financing, from reducing 
the proportion of state spending in the form of aid to local governments, or 
from shifting the tax burden to local government. A provision for 
emergency conditions is established and the repayment of voter approved 
bonded indebtedness is guaranteed. Implementation of this section is 
specified in Sections 26 through 34, inclusive, of this Article. 
The Michigan Supreme Court has stated that Section 25 "is merely an introduction 
to the provisions contained in §§ 26-34 and is not an independent statement of rights 
or duties." Durant, 381 N.W.2d at 666 n.4. 
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2. The state is prohibited from requiring new or expanded 
activities by local governments without full state financing. 
3. The state is prohibited from reducing the proportion of 
state spending in the form of state aid to local governments. 
4. The state is prohibited from shifting the tax burden to 
local governments. -
Sections 26 through 34 of Article IX expand on Section 25's 
broad provisions. First, Section 26 limits the amount of taxes the 
state may collect in any given fiscal year to 9.49 percent of personal 
income in Michigan during the preceding calendar year.4 Section 26 
further provides that taxpayers are to receive a refund if revenues 
exceed the limit by 1 percent or more.5 
Second, in the event of a fiscal emergency, Section 27 permits a 
one-year suspension of the Section 26 revenue limit upon the 
Governor's request and the two-thirds concurrence of the 
Legislature.6 
Third, Section 28 prohibits deficit spending.' 
Fourth, Section 29 prohibits the state from circumventing the 
taxing and spending limits of Sections 26 and 28 in two respects. 
Section 29 prohibits the state from reducing the state financed 
proportion of necessary costs for mandated programs in effect when 
the Headlee Amendment was ratified.8 This provision is known as the 
maintenance-of-support provision. Section 29 further prohibits the 
state from requiring units of local government to perform new or 
increased activities since ratification of the Headlee Amendment 
without appropriating funds to cover the necessary increased costs.9 
Fifth, Section 30 is a corollary to Section 29. While Section 29 
ensures that the proportion of state money paid to local government 
to cover necessary costs will not decrease from fiscal year 1978-79 
levels, Section 30 provides that the percentage of the total state 
budget earmarked for local government spending will not decline 
from the fiscal year 1978-79 leve1.10 
Sixth, Section 31 contains three provisions aimed at protecting 
the taxpayer from paying an increased share of his income to local 
government units: (a) voter approval is required for any new local tax 
4. HEADLEE BLUE RIBBON COMM'N REpORT TO GoVERNORjOHN ENGLER, 9, 1994 
[hereinafter HEADLEE COMM'N REPORT]. See also MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 26. 
5. HEADLEE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 9. 
6. MICH. CONST. art IX, § 27. 
7. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 28. 
8. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 29. 
9. [d. 
10. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 30. 
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or any increase in the rate of an existing local tax; (b) if the base 
upon which any existing local tax is expanded, then the tax rate must 
be reduced; and (c) if annual property valuations are greater than 
the annual rate of inflation, then the property tax rate in the local 
governmental unit must be reduced so that the increased tax levy on 
existing property is no greater than the rate of inflation. l1 
Seventh, Section 32 gives taxpayers standing to challenge alleged 
violations of the Headlee Amendment and vests the Court of Appeals 
with original jurisdiction over such taxpayer suits.12 
Finally, Section 34 authorizes the Legislature to enact 
implementing legislation to bring the terms of the Headlee 
Amendment into effect in Michigan.IS The following table 
summarizes the Headlee Amendment's provisions: 
11. MICH. CONSt. art. IX, § 3l. 
12. MICH. CoNSt. art. IX, § 32. 
13. MICH. CoNSt. art. IX, § 34. 
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Article IX, § Introduction to the Headlee Amendment 
25 
Article IX, § State Revenue Limit Capping State Taxes 
26 at 9,49 Percent of Residents' Personal Income 
Article IX, § Fiscal Emergency Exception 
27 
Article IX, § State Spending Limit Prohibiting Deficit 
28 Spending 
Article IX, § Prohibition Against Unfunded State 
29 Mandates to Local Government and 
Requirement of Maintenance of Support to 
Local Government 
Article IX, § Prohibition Against Reducing the 
30 Proportion of Total State Funds Paid to Local 
Government (41.61 Percent of State Budget) 
Article IX, § Prohibition Against New or Increased 
31 Local Taxes Without Voter Approval; Property 
Tax Increases Capped At the Lesser of the 
Rate of Inflation or the Increase in Property 
Valuation 
Article IX, § Authorization of Taxpayer Suits in the 
32 Court of Appeals 
Article IX, § Definitions 
33 
Article IX, § Authorization to Enact Implementing 
34 Legislation 
This article is a restatement of the law of the Headlee 
Amendment. It summarizes the Amendment's provisions, provides 
an overview of the statues enacted by Legislature since 1978 to 
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implement those provisions, and analyzes the growing body of case 
law interpreting the Amendment. 
II. ARncLE IX, § 26: THE STATE REVENUE LIMIT 
Section 26 limits the amount of taxes the state may impose in any 
given fiscal year to 9.49 percent of personal income in Michigan 
during the preceding calendar year.14 Section 26 provides in full: 
There is hereby established a limit on the total amount of 
taxes which may be imposed by the Legislature in any fiscal 
year on the taxpayers of this state. This limit shall not be 
changed without approval of the majority of the qualified 
electors voting thereon, as provided for in Article 12 of the 
Constitution. Effective with fiscal year 1979-1980, and for 
each fiscal year thereafter, the Legislature shall not impose 
taxes of any kind which, together with all other revenues of 
the state, federal aid excluded, exceed the revenue limit 
established in this section. The revenue limit shall be equal 
to the product of the ratio of Total State Revenues in fiscal 
year 1978-1979 divided by the Personal Income of Michigan 
in calendar year 1977 multiplied by the Personal Income of 
Michigan in either the prior calendar year or the average of 
Personal Income of Michigan in the previous three calendar 
years, whichever is greater. 
For any fiscal year in the event that Total State Revenues 
exceed the revenue limit established in this section by 1 % or 
more, the excess revenues shall be refunded pro rata based 
on the liability reported on the Michigan income tax and 
single business tax (or its successor tax or taxes) annual 
returns filed following the close of such fiscal year. If the 
excess is less than 1 %, this excess may be transferred to the 
State Budget Stabilization Fund. 
The revenue limitation established in this section shall not 
apply to taxes imposed for the payment of principal and 
interest on bonds, approved by the voters and authorized 
under Section 15 of this Article, and loans to school districts 
authorized under Section 16 of this Article. 
If responsibility for. funding a program or programs is 
transferred from one level of government to another, as a 
consequence of constitutional amendment, the state 
revenue and spending limits may be adjusted to 
accommodate such change, provided that the total revenue 
authorized for collection by both state and local 
14. See HEADLEE COMM'N REpORT, supra, note 4, at 9. 
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governments does not exceed that amount which would 
have been authorized without such change.15 
A. Definitions 
Section 33 of Article IX defines the terms "Total State Revenues" 
and "Personal Income of Michigan" as follows: 
"Total State Revenues" includes all general and special 
revenues, excluding federal aid, as defined in the budget 
message of the Governor for fiscal year 1978-1979. Total 
State Revenues shall exclude the amount of any credits 
based on actual tax liabilities or the imputed tax 
components of rental payments, but shall include the 
amount of any credits not related to actual tax liabilities.16 
"Personal Income of Michigan" is the total income received 
by persons in Michigan from all sources, as defined and 
officially reported by the United States Department of 
C . n ommerce or Its successor agency. 
Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 34 of Article IX 
to enact appropriate implementing legislation, the Legislature, in 
1998, provided definitions of "total state revenues" and "personal 
income of Michigan" that expand on the Section 33 definitions. IS It is 
important to note that while the Michigan Legislature is authorized 
to enact appropriate implementing legislation, the Legislature's 
statutory definitions of constitutional terms are not binding on the 
courts. In some instances, Michigan courts have accepted the 
Legislature'S Headlee Amendment defmitions.19 In other instances, 
the courts have rejected the Legislature's definitions.2o 
Turning to the Michigan Legislature'S interpretation of Section 
26 definitions, Section 18.1350a of the Michigan Compiled Laws 
provides: 
As used in sections 26 to 28 of Article IX of the state 
constitution of 1963: 
15. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 26. 
16. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 33. 
17. Id. 
18. MICH. COMPo LAwsANN. § 18.1350a (West 1994). 
19. See, e.g., Durant v. Dep't of Educ., 342 N.W.2d 591 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) 
(adopting Legislature'S definition of "state law"). 
20. See, e.g., Durant v. State Bd. of Educ., 381 N.W.2d 662 (Mich. 1985) 
(rejecting the Legislature'S exclusion from the term "necessary costs" costs 
recoverable from the federal government). 
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(a) "Personal income of Michigan" for a calendar year 
means total annual personal income as officially reported by 
the United States department of commerce, bureau of 
economic analysis, in August of the year following the 
calendar year for which the report is made. Revision of the 
total annual personal income figure as reported by the 
bureau of economic analysis after August of the year 
following the calendar year for which the report is made 
shall not cause personal income of Michigan as defined to 
be revised. 
(b) "Total state revenues" means the combined increases in 
net current assets of the general fund and special revenue 
funds, except for component units included within the 
special revenue group for reporting purposes only. For 
fiscal years beginning after September 30, 1986, total state 
revenues shall be computed on the basis of generally 
accepted accounting principles as defined in this act. 
However, total state revenues shall not include the 
following: 
(i) Financing sources which have previously been 
counted as revenue, for the purposes of section 26 of 
Article IX. such as, beginning fund balance, 
expenditure refunds, and residual-equity and operating 
transfers from within the group of funds. 
(ii) Current assets generated from transactions 
involving fixed assets and long-term obligations in 
which total net assets do not increase. 
(iii) Revenues which are not available for normal public 
functions of the general fund and special revenue 
funds. 
(iv) Federal aid. 
(v) Taxes imposed for the payment of principal and 
interest on voter-approved bonds and loans to school 
districts authorized under section 16 of Article IX. of the 
state constitution of 1963. 
(vi) Tax credits based on actual tax liabilities or the 
imputed tax components of rental payments, but not 
including the amount of any credits not related to 
actual tax liabilities. 
(vii) Refunds or payments of revenues recognized in a 
prior period. 
1037 
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(viii) The effects of restatements of beginning balances 
required by changes in generally accepted accounting 
principles. 
(c) The calculation of total state revenues required by 
section 350b(3) shall not be adjusted after the filing of the 
report required by June 30, 1989, unless future changes in 
generally accepted accounting principles would substantially 
distort the comparability of the base year and the current 
and future ~ears. In no event shall intervening years be 
recalculated.21 -
B. Reporting Requirements. 
Before 1986, the revenue limit referred to in Article IX, Section 
26 had not been officially calculated and there was no annual report 
of compliance with said limit. Some evidence existed that the limit 
may have been exceeded in fiscal year 1984-85.22 Reaction to this 
evidence triggered an intensive review by the Governor's Office and 
·the Legislature of the original methodology used to determine the 
tax limit. This review produced a limit of 9.49 percent, compared to 
the 10.1 percent limit that had been widely accepted before 1986.2s 
The 9.49 percent limit was approved by the Auditor General in 
1986.24 Following this inter-branch review, the Legislature enacted a 
law that requires the Director of the Department of Management and 
Budget (DMB) to submit a report that calculates the revenue limit on 
an annual basis and the Director of DMB and the State Treasurer to 
prepare an annual report that summarizes in detail the State's 
compliance with the revenue limit.25 This report is then reviewed by 
21. MICH. COMPo LAwsANN. § 18.1350a (West 1994) (footnote omitted). 
22. HEADLEE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 9. 
23. ld. 
24. ld. 
25. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. §§ 18.1350b(3), 18.1350e, 205.30b (West 1994). 
Per these statutes, the State Budget Director is also required to submit monthly 
financial reports to the Legislature that state, inter alia, the amount of monthly 
revenue collected by the state. Section 18.1386 of the Michigan Compiled Laws 
provides: 
(1) The state budget director shall prepare monthly financial reports. 
(2) Within 30 days after the end of each month, the state budget director 
shall transmit copies of the monthly financial report to all the 
appropriations committee members and the fiscal agencies. The monthly 
financial report due by November 30 shall be the first monthly financial 
report to include statements concerning the fiscal year which began on 
October 1. 
(3) Each monthly financial report shall contain the following information: 
(a) A statement of actual monthly and year-to-date revenue collections for 
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the Auditor General who examines the past and present methodology 
of calculating revenues. 
C. Refunds of Excess Revenues. 
The second paragraph of Article IX, Section 26 of the Michigan 
Constitution provides that taxpayers are to receive a refund if tax 
revenues exceed the revenue limit by 1 percent or more.26 
Legislation enacted in 1988 clarified that refunds are predicated on 
revenues (not personal income) exceeding the revenue limit by 1 
percent.27 Section 18.1350d of the Michigan Compiled Laws sets 
forth the following revenue refund procedure: 
(1) The procedures enumerated in this section shall be 
followed when revenues are required to be refunded 
pursuant to section 26 of Article IX of the state constitution 
of 1963. 
(2) For any fiscal year in which total state revenues exceed 
the revenue limit as provided in section 26 of Article IX of 
the state constitution of 1963 by 1 % or more, the revenues 
in excess of the revenue limit shall be refunded pro rata 
based on the liability reported on the state income tax 
return filed pursuant to section 441 of Act No. 281 of the 
Public Acts of 1967, being section 206.441 of the Michigan 
Compiled Laws, and the single business tax return filed 
each operating fund; the general fundi general purpose revenues, school 
aid fund revenues, and the tax collections dedicated to the transportation 
funds; including a comparison with prior year amounts, statutory estimates, 
and the most recent estimates from the executive branch. 
(b) A statement of estimated year-end appropriations lapses and 
overexpenditures for the state general fund by principal department. 
(c) A statement projecting the ending state general fund balance for the 
fiscal year in progress. 
(d) A summary of current economic events relevant to the Michigan 
economy, and a discussion of any economic forecast or current knowledge 
of revenue collections or expenditure patterns that is the basis for a change 
in any revenue estimate or expenditure projection. . 
(e) A statement of estimated and actual total state revenues compared to 
the revenue limit provided for in section 26 of Article IX of the state 
constitution ofl963. 
(f) A statement of the estimated fiscal year-end balance of state payments to 
units of local government pursuant to section 30 of Article IX of the state 
constitution ofl963. 
(g) Any other information considered necessary by the state budget 
director or jointly requested by the chairpersons of the appropriations 
committees. Id. 
MICH. CoMP. LAwsANN. § 18.1386 (West 1994). 
26. MICH. CONSf., art. IX, § 26. 
27. MICH. CoMP. LAwsANN. § 18.1350d (West 1994). 
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pursuant to section 97 of Act No. 228 of the Public Acts of 
1975, being section 208.97 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, 
for the taxpayer's tax year beginning in the fiscal year for 
which it is determined that the revenue limit has been 
exceeded. 
(3) A refund shall not be required if total state revenues 
exceed the revenue limit by less than 1 %. 
(4) If total state revenues exceed the revenue limit by less 
than 1 %, the Governor shall recommend to the Legislature 
that the excess be appropriated to the countercyclical 
budget and economic stabilization fund, or its successor. 
(5) A refund required pursuant to this section shall be 
refunded during the fiscal year beginning on the October 1 
following the filing of the report required by section 350e 
which determines that the limit was exceeded in the prior 
fiscal year for which the report was filed. 28 
A Headlee Amendment refund was authorized by the Legislature 
in 1995 in the form ofa tax credit equal to 2 percent of the taxpayer's 
tax liability for the 1995 tax year.29 
The second paragraph of Section 26 further provides that "[i]f 
the excess is less than 1 %, this excess may be transferred to the State 
Budget Stabilization Fund."so Although Section 18.1350e(4) of the 
Michigan Compiled Laws requires the Governor to recommend that 
revenues that are less than 1 percent in excess of the limit be placed 
in the budget stabilization fund, there is no provision in the 
implementing legislation that requires the Legislature to accept the 
Governor's recommendation, nor is there any provision for an 
alternative disposition of such excesses in the event the Legislature 
does not accept his recommendation. If such a situation were to 
arise, political pressure presumably would be brought to bear on the 
Legislature to either accept the Governor's recommendation and 
deposit the excess in the budget stabilization fund or, in the 
alternative, refund the excess to taxpayers. 
D. Adjustments to the Revenue Limit 
The final paragraph of Section 26 provides for an adjustment of 
the revenue limit in the event that responsibility for funding a 
program is transferred, pursuant to a constitutional amendment, 
28. Id. (footnote omitted). 
29. SeeMICH. CoMP. LAwsANN. § 206.252. (West 1994). 
30. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 26 (emphasis added). 
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from the local to the state level, or vice versa.8) In addition, the 
paragraph states that the total revenue collected after the change 
may not exceed the amount authorized before the transfer.82 
E. Imposition of New State Taxes 
According to the Attorney General, Sections 25 and 26 do not 
prevent the state from imposing new taxes, provided the projected 
revenues and all other state revenues do not exceed the revenue limit 
of Section 26.88 This provision was most prominently challenged in 
1986. In 1986, the Attorney General ruled on whether the state excise 
taxes on hotel rooms and liquor that were credited to the convention 
facility development fund violated the Headlee Amendment.S4 Based 
upon projections for fiscal year 1986, it was determined that total 
revenues collected, including those from the subject state excise 
taxes, would not exceed the Section 26 revenue limit.35 Therefore, 
the Attorney General concluded that the state excise taxes credited to 
the convention facility development fund did not violate Section 26.86 
III. ARTICLE IX, § 27: THE FISCAL EMERGENCY EXCEPTION 
Section 27 of Article IX acts as a safety valve in the event of a 
fIscal emergency. It permits a one-year suspension of the Section 26 
revenue limit upon the Governor's request and the two-thirds 
concurrence by the Legislature. Section 27 provides in full: 
The revenue limit of Section 26 of this Article may be 
exceeded only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) 
The Governor requests the Legislature to declare an 
emergency; (2) the request is specifIc as to the nature of the 
emergency, the dollar amount of the emergency, and the 
method by which the emergency will be funded; and (3) the 
Legislature thereafter declares an emergency in accordance 
with the specifIc of the Governor's request by a two-thirds 
vote of the members elected to and serving in each house. 
The emergency must be declared in accordance with this 
section prior to incurring any of the expenses which 
constitute the emergency request. The revenue limit may 
31. MICH. CoNSf. art. IX, § 26. 
32. Although implementing legislation has not been enacted for this paragraph, 
it has been suggested that implementing legislation be enacted that would eliminate 
the taxing authority of the transferor agency or unit of government upon a transfer 
of funding responsibilities via constitutional amendment. See HEADLEE COMM'N 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 12. 
33. 1985-86 Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. 203. 
34. SeeMICH. COMPo LAwsANN. §§ 207.621, 436.141 (West 1994). 
35. See 1985-86 Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. 203. 
36. Id. 
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be exceeded only during the fiscal year for which the 
emergency is declared. In no event shall any part of the 
amount representing a refund under Section 26 of this 
Article be the subject of an emergency request. S7 
To date, no Section 27 emergency has been declared. 
IV. ARTICLE IX, § 28: THE STATE EXPENSE LIMIT 
The Section 26 revenue limit and the Section 28 expense limit 
work in tandem. Section 28 prohibits deficit spending and provides: 
"No expenses of state government shall be incurred in any fiscal year 
which exceed the sum of the revenue limit established in Sections 26 
and 27 of this Article plus federal aid and any surplus from a previous 
fiscal year."ss 
In implementing Section 28, the Michigan Legislature enacted 
the following provisions: 
(1) Expenditures of state government which exceed the sum 
of the following amounts shall not be incurred in any fiscal 
year: 
(i) The revenue limit established in section 350b. 
(ii) A surplus from a previous year. 
(iii) Federal aid. 
(iv) Taxes imposed for the payment of principal and 
interest on bonds, approved by the voters and 
authorized under section 15 of article IX of the state 
constitution of 1963. 
(v) Loans to school districts authorized under section 
16 of article IX of the state constitution of 1963. 
(vi) The dollar amount of an emergency established 
pursuant to section 27 of article IX of the state 
constitution of 1963. 
(vii) Other amounts excluded from the calculation of 
the revenue limit under the definition established in 
section 350a. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, an amount withdrawn 
from the countercyclical budget and economic stabilization 
37. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 27. 
38. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 28. 
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fund created pursuant to section 351 shall be considered a 
surplus.~ 
1043 
Since 1978, the annual state budget has been under the Section 
26 revenue limit. Consequently, Section 28 has not to date been the 
subject of litigation. 
V. ARTICLE IX, § 29: THE MAlNTENANCE-DF-SUPPORT CIAUSE 
Mter limiting state spending under Sections 26 and 28, the 
Headlee Amendment also prevents the state from circumventing 
these limits either by shifting the burden of administering state-
mandated programs to units of local government without the 
requisite funds to carry them out, or by reducing the state's 
proportion of spending for mandated programs in effect when the 
Headlee Amendment was ratified. Section 29 of the Headlee 
Amendment provides citizens protection from such state actions.40 
Section 29, also known as the maintenance-of-support clause, 
places two prohibitions on the State. First, the State is prohibited 
from reducing the state-financed proportion of the necessary costs of 
any activity or service required under state law of local governmental 
units prior to the adoption of the Headlee Amendment.41 Second, 
the State is prohibited from requiring new activities or services or 
increased in new activities or services of units of local government 
without a state appropriation and disbursement of funds to pay for 
the increased costs since the adoption of the Headlee Amendment.42 
Section 29 provides: 
The state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state 
financed proportion of the necessary costs of any existing 
activity or service required of units of Local Government by 
state law. A new activity or service or an increase in the level 
of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law 
shall not be required by the Legislature or any state agency 
of units of Local Government, unless a state appropriation is 
made and disbursed to pay the unit of Local Government 
for any necessary increased costs. The provision of this 
39. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 18.350c (West 1994) (footnotes omitted). See also 
MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. §§ 18350a, 18.350b and 18.351 (West 1994). 
40. As of 1996, 17 states have enacted unfunded state mandate legislation or 
ratified constitutional amendments prohibiting unfunded state mandates. See Robert 
M.M. Shaffer, Unfunded State Mandates and Local Governments, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 1057 
(1996) (citing Janet M. Kelley, Mandate Reimbursement Measures in the States, 24 AM. 
REv. OF PUB. ADMIN., 350, 353 (1994». 
41. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 29. 
42. Id. 
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section shall not apply to costs incurred pursuant to Article 
VI, Section 18.48 
Section 29 is intended to prevent a reduction below 1979 levels 
in the proportion of state funding for state-mandated activities and 
services, and to prevent unfunded state mandates for new or 
increased activities and services after 1979. Thus, a unit of local 
government that carries out a state-mandated program in 1998 is 
entitled to receive the same percentage of funding that the state 
provided for that program on a statewide basis in the base year 1978-
79 (this is only applicable, of course, for state-mandated programs in 
effect in 1978-79). For example, assume that in the base year 1978-79 
the statewide necessary costs to units of local government to cany out 
state-mandated Program A were $2 million, and that the State funded 
and disbursed a total of $1 million to units of local government in 
connection with Program A. The base-year percentage would be 50 
percent. Next assume that in 1994-95 (the payout year), the 
statewide necessary costs to units of local government of Program A 
were $4 million, but that the State funded and disbursed a total of 
$1. 75 million to units of local government for Program A. The 
payout-year percentage would be 43.75 percent. The State would 
have underpaid 6.25 percent (50-43.75), or $250,000 (6.25% x $4 
million). 
In Schmidt v. Department of Education,44 the Michigan Supreme 
Court filled one of the gaps created in Section 29 of the Headlee 
Amendment by providing a methodology for determining whether 
the state is meeting its obligation to maintain existing levels of 
funding to units of local government. The court ordered that the 
Schmidt parties to brief the three proposed methods of determining 
the state's compliance with Section 29: (1) state-to-state, (2) state-to-
local, and (3) local-to-Iocal.45 As two commentators explained: 
To illustrate the three competing approaches, assume that 
when the Headlee Amendment was adopted, state funding 
in the aggregate to local units for Service X was 50 percent 
of the aggregate costs of Service X statewide, with state 
funding to District A for Service X at 40 percent of the total 
cost of Service X to District A and state funding to District B 
for Service X at 60 percent of the total cost of Service X to 
43. ld. Article VI, § 18 of the Michigan Constitution governs the salaries of 
judges. 
44. 490 N.W.2d 584 (Mich. 1992). The Schmidt case was a consolidation of three 
groups of actions filed in the Michigan Court of Appeals under article 9, Section 32 
of the Michigan Constitution. For a history of the Durant proceedings, see Durant v. 
State of Michigan, 566 N.W.2d 272, 276-78 (Mich. 1997). 
45. Schmidt, 490 N.W.2d at 589. 
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District B. Under the state-to-state method, the state is 
obliged to continue aggregate funding at 50 percent of 
aggregate costs, while the costs of providing Service X in 
particular districts is not determinative. The state-to-Iocal 
method requires the state to fund both districts at a level of 
50 percent of the districts' costs for providing Service X, 
representing an increase in District A's funding and a 
decrease in District B's funding. Under the local-to-Iocal 
method, the state must continue funding each local unit at 
the level in effect at ratification of Headlee, such that 
District A's funding is continued at 40 percent of its costs to 
provide Service X and District B's funding is continued at 60 
percent of its costs to provide Service X.46 
1045 
The Schmidt court adopted the state-to-Iocal approach. The 
court observed that the first sentence of Section 29 focuses on a 
single proportionate obligation by the state measured during the base 
year, while the second sentence refers to unit and governmental body 
in the singular.47 This suggested to the court that the voters intended 
that the state's obligation ran to each unit oflocal government.48 
In Mayor of Detroit v. State of Michigan,49 the Michigan Court of 
Appeals held that a legislative act abolishing Detroit Recorder's Court 
and merging it with the Wayne Circuit Court did not violate Section 
29 of the Headlee Amendment. The court compared the method of 
funding state trial court operations in 1978 - the Headlee base year 
- with the method required under the act.50 The court concluded 
that the act did not mandate new activities for local units vis-a.-vis the 
state in comparison with 1978, nor did it increase the level of activity 
required of local units.51 The fact that a particular local unit (Le., 
Wayne County) may now be financing activities previously financed 
by another local unit (Le., the City of Detroit) did not violate 
Headlee: 
The Headlee Amendment does not directly address state 
mandates that result in shifts among local units or 
reductions in post-1978 state subsidies for particular units; it 
only guarantees that each local unit will receive the same 
46. Michael C. Fayz & Clara G. DeQuick, Annual Survey of Michigan Law: 
Constitutional Law, 40 WAYNEL. REv. 533, 546-47 (1994). 
47. Schmidt, 490 N.W.2d at 590. 
48. ld. at 591. 
49. 579 N.W.2d 378 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), afJ'd on other grounds sub nom. Judicial 
Attorneys Ass'n v. State of Michigan, 586 N.W.2d 894 (Mich. 1998). 
50. ld. at 385. 
51. ld. at 386 
HeinOnline -- 76 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 1046 1998-1999
1046 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 76:1031 
proportion of state funding provided on a statewide basis in 
the base year of 1978.52 
In the court's view, the legislative act merging the two courts 
merely continued existing activities, as opposed to mandating new 
activities or increasing the level of existing activities.53 Thus, the only 
remaining Headlee-related issue was whether the act reduced the 
state-financed proportion of the necessary costs of trial court 
operations to the units at issue from that provided on a statewide 
basis in 1978.54 The court found that, in 1978, the only state 
contribution to trial court operations was the financing of a portion 
of judicial salaries, and that the state still provides at least the same 
proportion of the total necessary costs of trial court operations to the 
units at issue as it provided on a statewide basis in 1978.55 Thus, no 
Headlee violation was found. 
In 1995, Wayne County brought an action against the state in the 
Court of Claims seeking money damages for an alleged violation of 
the unfunded state mandate provision of Section 29. In Wayne County 
Chief Executive v. Engler,56 the Court of Appeals held that (1) money 
damages are neither a necessary nor proper remedy in a suit in which 
a violation of the second sentence of Section 29 is established; (2) 
because money damages are not a remedy available in a suit brought 
pursuant to the second sentence of Section 29, the Court of Claims 
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Headlee Amendment claims; 
and (3) because money damages are not an available remedy in a suit 
brought pursuant to the second sentence of Section 29, neither the 
one-year limitations period governing Headlee taxpayer suits nor the 
three-year limitations period governing actions brought in the Court 
of Claims are applicable.57 
A. The Implementing Legislation 
The implementing legislation for Section 29 contains four 
provisions. 
First, in connection with disbursements of state funds to units of 
local government, the DMB is responsible for administering the 
disbursement of state funds to units of local government. The DMB 
also publishes guidelines and forms for units of local government 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 386-387. 
54. Mayor oJDetroit, 579 N.W.2d at 387. 
55. Id. 
56. 583 N.W.2d 512 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). 
57. Id. at 514. 
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when submitting a claim for disbursement.58 The implementing 
legislation requires an initial advance disbursement in accordance 
with a schedule of estimated paYIIlents that is adequate to meet state 
requirements as they fall due.59 The Governor is required to 
recommend to the Legislature those amounts which the Governor 
determines are required to be made to each unit of local government 
and the total amount of state disbursements required for all units of 
government.60 In the event a deficiency arises, the State Budget 
Director is to prorate the appropriated amounts among the eligible 
units of local government and is to recommend a supplemental 
appropriation to the Legislature sufficient to cover the deficiency.61 
Second, regarding administrative rules promulgated by a state 
agency that either mandate new activities or services to be performed 
by units of local government or increase the level of activity or service 
beyond that required by existing law, the state agency promulgating 
the administrative rule must submit a fiscal note to the Joint 
Committee on Administrative Rules (lCAR) and to the Director of 
DMB.62 The fiscal note must estimate the cost of the rule for the first 
three years of the rule's operation.53 The department is to submit a 
request for an appropriation, if necessary, for all rules approved by 
JCAR. The Legislature is then to aJlllropriate the amount required as 
stated in the Department's request. 
Third, the Legislature is required to promulgate joint rules that 
provide a method of identifying whether legislation creates a state 
mandate on units of local government, and that provide a method of 
estimating the revenue needed to reimburse units of local 
government. 65 The Legislature has never promulgated these joint 
rules. 
Instead, the Senate and House Fiscal Agencies make regular 
estimates for the Legislature of any costs that proposed legislation will 
impose on the state and units of local government.66 In addition, the 
58. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 21.235(5} (West 1994). Procedures that the DMB 
is to follow when disbursing state funds to units of local government, and that units 
of local government are to follow when making a claim for disbursements, are set out 
in MICH. CoMP. LAwsANN. § 21.238 (West 1994). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. MICH. CoMP. LAwsANN. § 21.235(1}-(4} (West 1994). 
62. Id. § 21.236. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. As of 1992, 28 states had adopted fiscal note requirements in an effort to 
raise legislators' awareness of the mandate problem and curb the passage of 
unfunded mandates. See Shaffer, supra note 40, at 1066. 
65. MICH. CoMP. LAwsANN. § 21.237 (West 1994). 
66. The Senate and House Fiscal Agencies are nonpartisan agencies whose 
primary mission to provide expert assistance to the Michigan Senate and House, 
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implementing legislation to Section 29 directs the DMB to submit an 
annual report to the Legislature that includes the following 
information: 
(1) [T]he department shall collect and tabulate relative 
information as to the following: 
(a) The state financed proportion of the necessary cost 
of an existing activity or service required of units of 
local government by existing law. 
(b) The nature and scope of each state requirement 
which shall require a disbursement under section 5. 
(c) The nature and scope of each action imposing a 
potential cost on a local unit of government which is 
not a state requirement and does not require a 
disbursement under this act. 
(2) The information shall include: 
(a) The identity or type of local unit and local unit 
agency or official to whom the state requirement or 
required existing activity or service is directed. 
(b) The determination of whether or not an 
identifiable local direct cost is necessitated by state 
requirement or the required existing activity or service. 
(c) The amount of state financial participation, 
meeting the identifiable local direct cost. 
(d) The state agency charged with supervising the state 
requirement or the required existing activity or service. 
(e) A brief description of the purpose of the state 
requirement or the required existing activity or service, 
and a citation of its origin in statute, rule, or court 
order.67 
Fourth, to administratively resolve cases involving disputed facts, 
the Section 29 implementing legislation creates the Local 
Government Claims Review Board within DMB.68 The Board consists 
respectively, regarding state fiscal issues. Both agencies also provide their respective 
Houses with detailed projections of estimated state revenues and expenditures. 
Governing Boards of the Senate and House oversee the operation and procedures of 
their respective Fiscal Agency. Reports of the Senate and House Fiscal Agencies are 
available from their 
websites,<http://www.state.mi.us/sfa>and<http:/ /www.state.mi.us/hfa>. 
67. MICH. COMPo LAwsANN. § 21.241 (West 1994). 
68. See id. § 21.240. 
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of nine members appointed by the Governor with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Each member is appointed for a three-year 
term. At least four members of the Board must be representatives of 
local government. The Board's function is set forth in Section 10(4) 
of the implementing legislation:69 "[T]he Board shall hear and decide 
upon disputed claims or upon an appeal by a local unit of 
government alleging that the local unit of government has not 
received the proper disbursement from funds appropriated for that 
purpose. "70 
If the Board approves a claim, a concurrent resolution of the 
Legislature must be adopted before the claim is paid. Appeals are 
limited to the following issues: 
(a) An appeal alleging that the director has incorrectly 
reduced payments to a local unit of government pursuant to 
section 5 (4). 
(b) An appeal alleging that the director has incorrectly or 
improperly reduced the amount of a disbursement when a 
claim was submitted pursuant to section 8 (2). 
(c) An appeal alleging that the local unit of government has 
not received a proper disbursement of funds appropriated 
to satisfy the state financed proportion of the necessary costs 
of an existing activity or service required of a local unit of 
government by existing law, pursuant to section 12.71 
The statute directs the DMB to adopt Board procedures for 
receiving claims, including a procedure for a hearing on a claim if so 
requested by a local unit of government.72 The DMB adopted such 
procedures in 1987.'18 
The most significant jurisdictional limitation on the Local 
Government Claims Review Board is that it has no power to hear 
cases brought by taxpayers challenging violations of the Headlee 
Amendment. As explained below, Section 32 of Article IX makes the 
Court of Appeals a court of original jurisdiction where taxpayers may 
bring Headlee Amendment challenges.74 
The Headlee Commission noted in late 1994 that the Local 
Government Claims Review Board has been underutilized. The 
Commission's Report observed: 
69. ld. § 21.240(4). 
70. ld. 
71. ld. § 21.240(6) (footnotes omitted). 
72. ld. § 21.244. 
73. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE, RULES 21.101-21.401. 
74. See MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 32. 
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Although claims have been filed with the state, the Claims 
Review Board has never met to review those claims. This has 
principally occurred because the issues pending before the 
Board have been tied up in the Durant litigation. The 
ongoing delay in that litigation has unfortunately 
discouraged local units from filing claims on other issues.7s 
It seems safe to concluae that the Local Government Claims 
Review Board has not yet realized its full potential. 
B. The Meaning ojthe Term ''Necessary Costs" 
Section 29 prohibits the state from reducing the state-financed 
proportion of the necessary costs of any existing activity or service 
required of units of local government under state law. The 
Legislature has defined the term "necessary cost" as follows: 
the net cost of an activity or service provided by a local unit 
of government. The net cost shall be the actual cost to the 
state if the state were to provide the activity or .service 
mandated as a state requirement, unless otherwise 
determined by the Legislature when making a state 
requirement. Necessary cost does not include the cost of a 
state requirement if the state requirement satisfies 1 or 
more of the following conditions: 
(a) The state requirement cost does not exceed a de 
minimus [sic] cost. 
(b) The state requirement will result in an offsetting 
savings to an extent that, if the duties of a local unit 
which existed before the effective date of the state 
requirement are considered, the requirement will not 
exceed a de minimis cost. 
(c) The state requirement imposes additional duties on 
a local unit of government which can be performed by 
that local unit of government at a cost not" to exceed a 
de minimis cost. 
(d) The state requirement imposes a cost on a local 
unit of government that is recoverable from a federal or 
state categorical aid program, or other external 
financial aid. A necessary cost excluded by this 
subdivision shall be excluded only to the extent that it 
is recoverable.76 
75. HEADLEE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 16. 
76. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 21.233(6) (West 1994). 
HeinOnline -- 76 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 1051 1998-1999
1999] THE HEADLEE AMENDMENT 1051 
The term "de minimis cost" is defined as "a net cost to a local 
unit of government resulting from a state requirement which does 
not exceed $300.00 per claim.,,77 
In Durant v. State Board of Education (Durant 11),78 the Michigan 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of what constitutes a "necessary 
cost" within the meaning of the maintenance-of-support provision of 
Article IX, Section 29. (The term "necessary costs" and "necessary 
increased costs" are both found in Section 29, the latter term being 
used in the context of post-Headlee state mandates. Presumably, the 
courts would interpret both terms in the same manner.) The Durant 
II plaintiffs argued that the term "necess~ costs" means "useful or 
beneficial," citing McCulloch v. Maryland,79 the seminal U.S. Sugreme 
Court decision interpreting the "necessary and proper" clause. The 
Durant II defendants argued that "necessary" was synonymous with 
"essential or indispensable."a1 The defendants urged the court to 
adopt the Legislature'S definition of "necessary costs" found in the 
implementing legislation quoted above. The court accepted the 
defendants' argument, concluding that the more limited definition 
of "essential or indispensable" was closer to the voters' intent.52 The 
court approved the Legislature'S definition of "necessary costs" found 
in the first part of the implementing legislation.8s The court agreed 
that the Legislature'S use of the actual cost to the state if it provided 
the service is a legitimate benchmark, adding that the actual market 
cost would also be a reliable measure.84 
The Michigan Court of Appeals has cautioned that the "actual 
costs" that a unit of local government incurs is not necessarily to be 
equated with "necessary costs.,,85 However, the same court has held 
that the "incremental costs" of providing a state-mandated program, 
such as special education, do not necessarily equate with "necessary 
costs" because the existing infrastructure provided by a regular 
education program would have to be furnished to special education 
students in the absence of a regular education program.86 In one of 
the last phases of the Durant litigation, the court of appeals held that 
once it is established that an activity or service is required by state law, 
the plaintiff has the burden of showing the actual cost to all units of 
77. ld. § 21.232(4). 
78. 381 N.W.2d 662 (Mich. 1985). 
79. 17 U.S. (4Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
80. Durant, 381 N.W.2d at 672-73. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 18. 
81. ld. at 673. 
82. ld. 
83. ld. 
84. ld. 
85. See Durant v. Dep't of Educ., 513 N.W.2d 195, 198-99 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994). 
86. ld. at 201. 
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local government resulting from carrying out the state-mandated 
activity or service.87 Once a prima facie case is established, the 
burden then shifts to the state to show that these "actual costs" were 
not "necessary costs."ss In an earlier phase of the Durant litigation, the 
court of appeals stated that "necessary costs" would be the least 
expensive among alternative methods by which a unit of local 
government could satisfy the state-mandated activity or service.89 
In Durant II, The Michigan Supreme Court invalidated the 
legislative exclusion from necessary costs contained in Section 
21.233(6) (d) of the Michigan Compiled Laws, stating "[T]he 
[Headlee] amendment unambiguously forbids state reduction of the 
proportion of state aid below the 1978-79 levels for specific 
requirements imposed by statute or state agency rule."oo The court 
held that as long as the activity is state-mandated, even if federally-
funded in part, to the extent the State uses that section of the 
implementing legislation to reduce the amount of categorical school 
aid and to require units of local government to make up the 
difference through the use of outside funding, the statute violates the 
Headlee Amendment's prohibition on reductions in the proportion 
of state aid below 1978-79 levels for specific requirements imposed by 
statute or state agency rule.91 
C. The Meaning of the Term "Required . .. by State Law" 
What is the meaning of the phrase "required ... by state law," 
found in Article IX, Section 29? In the implementing legislation for 
Section 29, the Legislature has conflated the terms "required" and 
"state law" into the single term "state requirement." The legislation 
defines "state requirement" as follows: '" [s] tate requirement' means a 
state law which requires a new activity or service or an increased level 
of activity or service beyond that required of a local unit of 
government by an existing law."92 
The Legislature has excluded from its definition of "state 
requirement" the following: 
(a) A requirement imposed on a local unit of government 
by a state statute or an amendment to the state constitution 
of 1963 adopted pursuant to an initiative petition, or by a 
87. Durant v. Dep't ofEduc., 541 N.W.2d 278, 280 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). 
88. [d. 
89. See Durant v. Dep't of Educ., 463 N.W.2d 461 (Mich. Ct. App.1990). 
90. Durant, 381 N.W.2d at 673-74. 
91. [d. at 674. 
92. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 21.234(5) (West 1994). 
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state law or rule enacted or promulgated to implement such 
a statute or constitutional amendment. 
(b) A requirement imposed on a local unit of government 
by a state statute or an amendment to the state constitution 
of 1963, enacted or adopted pursuant to a proposal placed 
on the ballot by the Legislature, and approved by the voters, 
or by a state law or rule enacted or promulgated to 
implement such a statute or constitutional amendment. 
(c) A court requirement. 
(d) A due process requirement. 
(e) A federal requirement. 
(f) An implied federal requirement. 
(g) A requirement of a state law which applies to a larger 
class of persons or corporations and does not apply 
principally or exclusively to a local unit or units of 
government. 
(h) A requirement of a state law which does not require a 
local unit of government to perform an activity or service 
but allows a local unit of government to do so as an option, 
and by opting to perform such an activity or service, the 
local unit of government shall comply with certain 
minimum standards, requirements, or guidelines. 
(i) A requirement of a state law which changes the level of 
requirements, standards, or guidelines of an activity or 
service that is not required of a local unit of government by 
existing law or state law, but that is provided at the option of 
the local unit of government. 
(j) A requirement of a state law enacted pursuant to section 
18 of article 6 of the state constitution of 1963.93 
1053 
The terms "court requirement," "due process requirement," 
"federal requirement," and "implied federal requirement" are 
defined at Sections 21.232(3), 21.232(7), 21.233(2), and 21.233(3), 
respectively of the Michigan Compiled Laws.94 
93. Id. §§ 21.234 (a)-G). 
94. These terms are defined as follows: 
"Court requirement" means a new activity or service or an increase in the 
level of activity or service beyond that required by existing law which 
is required of a local unit of government in order to comply with a final 
state or federal court order arising from the interpretation of the 
constitution of the United States, the state constitution of 1963, an existing 
law, or a federal statute, rule, or regulation. Court requirement includes a 
state law whose enactment is required by a final state or federal court order. 
[d. § 21.232(3). 
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1. Are state constitutional provisions within the scope of the term "state 
law" found in Article IX, Section 29? 
In Durant II, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether state constitutional provisions are within the scope of the 
term "state law" as used in Article IX, Section 29. The specific issue 
was whether the constitutional mandate of Article VIII, Section 2 of 
the Michigan Constitution, providing for a free public education is a 
"state law" for purposes of Section 29.95 The Michigan Supreme 
Court answered this question in the negative, holding that it was not 
the intent of the voters to include in Section 29 any obligations that 
may be imposed upon local governmental units by Article VIII, 
Section 2 of the Constitution (and, by a parity of reasoning, by any 
other provision of the State Constitution), with the expressly stated 
exception of Article VI, Section 18.96 Reading the first and second 
sentences of Section 29 as being in pari materia, the court concluded 
that the term "state law" found in the first sentence of Section 29 
refers to state statutes and state agency rules, given that the phrase 
"required by the Legislature or any state agency" is used in the 
second sentence of Section 29.97 The court added that a restrictive 
view of the term "state law" is warranted because ballot proposals are 
carefully scrutinized in Michigan to eliminate any possibility of 
confusion.98 
"Due process requirement" means a statute or rule which involves the 
administration of justice, notification and conduct of public hearings, 
procedures for administrative and judicial review of action taken by a local 
unit of government or the protection of the public from malfeasance, 
misfeasance, or nonfeasance by an official of a local unit of government, 
and which involves the provision of due process as it is defined by state and 
federal courts when interpreting the federal constitution or the state 
constitution ofl963. 
[d. § 21.232 (7). 
"Federal requirement" means a federal law, rule, regulation, executive 
order, guideline, standard, or other federal action which has the force and 
effect of law and which requires the state to take action affecting local units 
of government. 
[d. § 21.233(2). 
"Implied federal requirement" means a federal law, rule, regulation, 
executive order, guideline, standard, or other federal action which 
has the force and effect of law and which does not directly require the state 
to take action affecting units of local government, but will, according to 
federal law, result in a loss of federal funds or federal tax credits if state 
action is not taken to comply with the federal action. 
[d. § 21.233(3). 
95. Durant, 381 N.W.2d at 667. 
96. [d .. 
97. [d. at 668. 
98. [d. The Court refused to place any reliance on the Drafters' Notes to the 
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2. What activities or services are "required n under state law? 
Section 29's freeze on the proportion of state money paid to 
units of local government to defray their necessary costs applies only 
to activities or services that are required by state law and that are 
funded, in whole or in part, by the state. The Michigan courts have 
held that the State is not obligated to reimburse units of local 
government for increased or expanded activities or services if the 
initial activity or service is optional.99 The courts have also been asked 
to determine whether certain activities and services performed by 
units of local government are "required" by state law, as that term is 
used in Article IX, Section 29. The following cases are illustrative of 
their holdings: 
a. Public Education 
In Durant II, the Supreme Court concluded that free public 
education, being required under the State Constitution, is thus not 
required under state law as that term is used in Section 29, 
notwithstanding Section 380.1284 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, 
which mandates 180 days of school. Federally-mandated educational 
programs administered by the State also are not within the ambit of 
Section 29.100 However, if the activity or service is also mandated 
under state law, such as special education programs, then it is within 
the ambit of Section 29.101 
b. Fire Protection 
The state is not required to reimburse a municipality for fire 
protection for state-owned buildings because municipalities are not 
required by state law to provide fire protection services.102 Similarly, 
because municipalities are not required to provide fire protection 
under state law, state-mandated overtime compensation to 
firefighters is outside the scope of Section 29.103 
c. Waste Disposal and Other Public Works Projects 
Because a county is not required to operate a solid waste disposal 
site, the Michigan courts have held that the state is not required to 
reimburse the county for upgrading a landfill in order to comply with 
Headlee Amendment, inasmuch as they were published after the Amendment was 
passed and were, in any event, internally inconsistent on this issue. Id. at 669 n.12. 
99. Livingston County v. Dep't of Management and Budget, 425 N.W.2d 65, 69-
70 (Mich. 1988). 
100. See Durant v. State of Michigan, 566 N.W.2d 272, 282 (Mich. 1997). 
101. See id. See also Schmidt v. Dep't of Educ., 490 N.W.2d 584 (Mich. 1992). 
102. See City of Ann Arborv. Michigan, 347 N.W.2d 10 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). 
103. See Saginaw Firefighters Ass'n, Local 422 v. City of Saginaw, 357 N.W.2d 908, 
909 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). 
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a state environmental law. 104 Similarly, the courts have also held that 
the costs associated with implementing state requirements regarding 
sewage disposal systems operated by municipalities are not within the 
scope of Section 29 because sewage disposal is an optional activity 
under state law.lo5 
The Attorney General has issued an opinion that Section 
339.2011 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, which requires units of 
local government engaged in public works projects to use licensed 
architects, engineers, and land surveyors on projects costing $15,000 
or more, is not within the scope of Section 29 because units of local 
government are under no state-mandated obligation to engage in 
public works projects.106 
d. Assistance to the Accused and to Grime Victims. 
The Attorney General has issued an opinion that state law 
requiring county prosecutors to assist the accused in locating and 
serving witnesses is within the scope of Section 29, as are services to 
crime victims provided by county prosecutors pursuant to the Crime 
Victim's Rights Act. lo7 
D. The Method of Funding New State Mandates. 
If a unit of local government is mandated by state law to perform 
a new activity or service, must the Legislature enact a new 
appropriation that specifically identifies and provides the necessary 
funds, or may the Executive Branch reimburse the unit of local 
government from the existing budget? In Mahaffey v. Attorney 
General/OS plaintiffs brought a state constitutional challenge to 1993 
legislation that required physicians to provide information to female 
patients contemplating an abortion. In the context of the Headlee 
Amendment, the Attorney General conceded that the informed 
consent law requires new activities or services to be performed by 
local public health departments.109 The funding for this new activity 
or service was to come from the Department of Health's existing 
budget. The plaintiffs argued that any funding had to come from a 
specific appropriation from the Legislature earmarked for that 
104. Livingston County, 425 N.W.2d at 72. 
lO5. See Kramer v. City of Dearborn Heights, 496 N.W.2d 301 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1992). 
106. See 1983-84 Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. 339. 
107. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 780.751 (West 1994). See also 1989-90 Mich. Att'y 
Gen. Op. 72. 
108. 564 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). 
109. Id. at 112. 
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purpose.lIO The court of appeals agreed with the Attorney General's 
position that the Headlee Amendment does not require the 
Legislature to enact a new appropriation specifically identifying and 
providing funds for new services required of units of local 
government.111 The court stated that Article IX, Section 29 requires 
only that a state appropriation be made to pay the local governmental 
unit for any increased costs.112 In accord with the voters' call for 
responsible and cost-efficient government reflected in the Headlee 
Amendment, the executive branch may fund a new activity or service 
required of units of local government by the Legislature from an 
existing appropriation.1l3 
VI. ARTICLE IX, SECTION 30: PROHIBmON AGAINST REDUCING THE 
PROPORTION OF TOTAL STATE FUNDs PAID TO LOCAL GoVERNMENT 
Section 30 of the Headlee Amendment is a corollary to Section 
29. While Section 29 ensures that the proportion of state money paid 
to local government to cover necessary costs will not drop below fiscal 
year 1978-79 levels, Section 30 provides that the percentage of the 
total state budget earmarked for local government spending will not 
decline from the fiscal year 1978-79 level. Section 30 states: "[T]he 
proportion of total state spending paid to all units of Local 
Government, taken as a group, shall not be reduced below that 
proportion in effect in fiscal year 1978-79."114 
The DMB has determined that the fiscal year 1978-79 proportion 
of state spending for local government is 41.61 percent.lIS The DMB 
used three criteria to determine whether state spending was paid to a 
unit of local government: (1) the unit must be a governmental entity; 
(2) the unit must receive payment from the state; and (3) the source 
of the payment must be from state-raised revenues rather than from 
federal funds or private or local funds that might flow through the 
state treasury.lIS According to the DMB, the state has failed to meet 
that percentage in only two years, fiscal year 1981-82 when the 
percentage of state spending on units of local government was 41.34 
percent, and fiscal year 1982-83 when the percentaHe of state 
spending on units oflocal government was 41.25 percent. 7 
110. Id. at 108. 
111. Id. at 112. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 30. 
115. HEADLEE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 18. 
116. Oakland County v. Dep't of Mental Health, 443 N.W.2d 805, 808 (Mich. Ct. 
App.1989). 
117. HEADLEE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at Exhibit 3-4. 
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A. The Implementing Legislation 
The current version of the Section 30 implementing legislation 
was first enacted in 1984, and was substantially amended in 1988. 
The implementing legislation begins with Section 18.1349 of the 
Michigan Compiled Laws, which provides: 
In accordance with the provision of section 30 of Article IX 
of the state constitution of 1963, the proportion of total 
state spending from state sources paid to all units of local 
government shall not be less than the proportion in effect in 
fiscal year 1978-1979. The executive budget submitted to 
the Legislature and the budget enacted by the Legislature 
shall be in compliance with section 30 of Article IX of the 
state constitution of 1963.118 
Next, Section 18.1350 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. addresses 
the accounting methodology for certain aspects of state spending. It 
provides: 
(1) If state government assumes the financing and 
administration of a function, after December 22, 1978, 
which was previously performed by a unit of local 
government, the state payments for the function shall be 
counted as state spending paid to units of local government. 
(2) Amounts excepted from the financial liability of a 
county under section 302(2) (c) of the mental health code, 
Act No. 258 of the Public Acts of 1974, being section 
330.1302 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, shall be counted 
as state spending paid to local units of government. 
(3) State spending paid to units of local government shall 
include the same proportion of the state's short-term 
interest and interfund borrowing expense as the proportion 
of state spending from state resources paid to all units of 
local government, as is established pursuant to section 349. 
(4) Refunds or other repayments of prior year revenues 
shall not be considered in the determination of total state 
di 119 spen ng. 
Additionally, the Legislature has enacted definitions of the terms 
"state spending paid to units of local government,» "total state 
spending," "total state spending from state sources," and "unit of 
local government.,,120 
118. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 18.1349 (West 1994). 
119. Id. at § 18.350. 
120. Those terms are defined as follows: 
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The Legislature has also directed the State Budget Director to 
make an annual report to the Legislature of Section 30 funding. 121 It 
has also adopted a procedure for making up deficiencies in Section 
30 funding that requires that deficiencies be made up in the fiscal 
year following the fiscal year in which the deficiency in payments was 
identified and reported to the Legislature.l22 
"State spending paid to units of local government" means the sum of total 
state spending from state sources paid to a unit of local government. State 
spending paid to a unit of local government does not include a payment 
made pursuant to a contract or agreement entered into or made for the 
provision of a service for the state or to state property, ~d loans made by 
the state to a unit oflocal government. 
1d. § 18.1304(3}. 
"Total state spending" means the sum of state operating fund expenditures, 
not including transfers for financing between funds. 
1£1. § 18.1305(1}. 
"Total state spending from state sources" means the sum of state operating 
fund expenditures not including transfers for financing between funds, 
federal aid, and restricted local and private sources of financing. 
1d. § 18.1305(2}. 
"Unit of local government" means a political subdivision of this state, 
including school districts, community college districts, intermediate school 
districts, cities, villages, townships, counties, and authorities, if the political 
subdivision has as its primary purpose the providing of local governmental 
service for citizens in a geographically limited area of the state and has the 
power to act primarily on behalf of that area. 
1d. § 18.1115(6}. 
Article IX, § 33 defines the term "Local Government" as follows: 
"Local Government" means any political subdivision of the state, including, 
but not restricted to, school districts, cities, villages, townships, charter 
townships, counties, charter counties, authorities created by the state, and 
authorities created by other units oflocal government. 
121. Section 18.1497(1} of the Michigan Compiled Laws provides: 
The director shall transmit to the auditor general for review and comment, 
not later than May 31 of each year, an itemized statement of the state 
spending paid to units of local government and total state spending from 
state sources for the fiscal year in which this act takes effect, and each fiscal 
year thereafter, including a calculation of the proportion of state spending 
paid to units oflocal government to total state spending from state sources. 
The report shall be published by submission to the Legislature not later 
thanJune 30 of each year. 
MICH. CoMP. LAwsANN. § 18.1497(1} (West 1994). 
122. Section 18.1497(2}-(3} of the Michigan Compiled Laws provides: 
(2) If the proportion calculated pursuant to subsection (I) [MICH. COMPo 
LAwsANN. § 18.1497(1}], is less than required by section 349 [MICH. COMPo 
LAws ANN. § 18.1349], the statements required by this section shall report 
the amount of additional payments to units of local government which 
would have been necessary to meet the requirements of section 349. This 
amount shall be payable to units of local government not later than in the 
fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the deficiency in payments to 
units of local government was ascertained and reported to the Legislature. 
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Finally, the Legislature has established a local government 
payment fund when additional state funding to units of local 
government is required under Section 30.123 
B. Judicial Interpretation of Section 30 
The Section 30 case law is sparse. The Supreme Court has 
rejected the argument that Section 30 mandates that state funds paid 
to individual units of local government (for example, school districts) 
must remain in the same proportion as it was in fiscal year 1978-79. 
The Durant II court dismissed this contention, noting: 
The clear language of this provision makes it unnecessary to 
explore this issue further. The term "taken as a group" clearly 
requires that the overall percentage allotment of the state budget for 
local units of government must remain at 1978 levels. We decline to 
accept a strained interpretation of an unambiguous statement of 
intent by the voters.124 
Likewise, the Michigan Court of Appeals has held that Section 30 
does not require the state to allocate a fixed percentage of its budget 
to a specific purpose or unit of local ~overnment (for example, to 
public education or to school districts). At the same time, however, 
in satisfying its Section 30 obligation, the state may not categorize as 
state spending to units of local government payments made to 
reimburse a local governmental unit for providing a service that was 
the state's obligation to provide in 1978.126 Thus, for purposes of 
(3) Any appropriations to the fund which are intended to make up a 
shortfall in payments to units of local government for a prior fiscal year 
shall not be considered as state spending from state resources or as state 
payments to units of local government in the fiscal year in which the 
amounts are appropriated. 
[d. § 18.1497(2)-(3) (footnote omitted). 
123. Section 18.1498 of the Michigan Compiled Laws provides: 
(1) The local government payment fund is hereby created. Money 
appropriated to the fund by the Legislature shall be reserved for use in a 
fiscal year when additional state payments to units of local government are 
necessary to meet the requirements of section 349. 
(2) The amounts recommended by the Governor or appropriated by the 
Legislature into the fund described in subsection (1) shall be considered, 
for purposes of fulfilling the requirements of section 349, as state spending 
to be paid to units oflocal government. 
[d. § 18.1498 .. 
124. Durant, 381 N.W.2d at 674 (citations omitted). 
125. See Waterford School Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 344 N.W.2d 19 (Mich. Ct. 
App.1983). 
126. See Oakland County. v. Dep't of Mental Health, 443 N.W.2d 805 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1989) (holding that the provision of mental health care services is a state 
obligation). 
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Section 30, when state funds are paid to a unit of local government 
for the purpose of discharging the state's obligation, such funds 
cannot be counted as "state spending paid to all units of local 
government."I27 If a contrary interpretation of Section 30 was 
adopted, then in times of shrinking state budgets, adding state 
payments for such programs to the category of state spending on 
units of local government could dilute the amount of state money 
paid to programs originally included in the 41.61-percent base-year 
level. 
VII. ARTICLE IX, § 31: PROIDBIDON AGAINST NEW OR INCREASED 
LOCAL TAXES WITHOUT VOTER APPROVAL 
While the focus of Article IX, Sections 26-30 is on state 
government revenue and spending limits, the focus of Article IX, 
Section 31 is on limiting the power of local government to tax. 
Article IX, Section 31 provides: 
Units of Local Government are hereby prohibited from 
levying any tax not authorized by law or charter when this 
section is ratified or from increasing the rate of an existing 
tax above that rate authorized by law or charter when this 
section is ratified, without the approval of a majority of the 
qualified electors of that unit of Local Government voting 
thereon. If the definition of the base of an existing tax is 
broadened, the maximum authorized rate of taxation on 
the new base in each unit of Local Government shall be 
reduced to yield the same estimated gross revenue as on the 
prior base. If the assessed valuation of property as finally 
equalized, excluding the value of new construction and 
improvements, increases by a larger percentage than the 
increase in the General Price Level from the previous year, 
the maximum authorized rate applied thereto in each unit 
of Local Government shall be reduced to yield the same 
gross revenue from existing property, adjusted for changes 
in the General Price Level, as could have been collected at 
the existing authorized rate on the prior assessed value. 
The limitations of this section shall not apply to taxes 
imposed for the payment of principal and interest on bonds 
or other evidence of indebtedness or for the payment of 
assessments on contract obligations in anticipation of which 
bonds are issued which were authorized prior to the 
effective date of this amendment.128 
127. [d. at 811. 
128. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 31. Article IX, Section 33 defines the term "General 
Price Level" as the "Consumer Price Index for the United States as defined and 
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The initial two sentences of Section 31 contain three main 
premises. First, voter approval is required for any new local tax or 
any increase in the rate of an existing tax. l29 Second, if the base upon 
which any existing tax is expanded, then the rate must be reduced. ISO 
For example, assume the state law establishing the base of the general 
property tax was amended to eliminate one or more of the current 
exemptions, with the result that the state equalized value of all 
property (the tax base) is increased. In that event, the maximum 
authorized property tax rate in each unit of local government would 
have to be reduced so that the total property tax levy of each local 
governmental unit would not increase as a result of the change in the 
base. This part of Section 31 prevents an increase in the total 
revenue yield that results from changes in the tax base. 
Third, the tax rate that is limited by Section 31 is "the rate 
authorized by law" or "the maximum authorized rate. HI31 This tax rate 
limitation ties into Article IX, § 6 which requires voter approval for 
ill ' 132 any mage mcrease. 
The third sentence of Section 31 is arguably the most well-known 
part of the Headlee Amendment, at least for Michigan property 
owners. It creates a mechanism for reducing property taxes when 
assessments increase faster than the rate of inflation. This sentence 
of Section 31 provides for what is popularly known as "Headlee 
rollbacks." The provision undergirds the first two sentences of 
Section 31 that require voter approval for new or increased local 
taxes and that require a proportional reduction in the rate of any 
existing local tax when the base is broadened. ISS A millage that is 
allocated from the basic 15 mills or the separate 18 mill tax limitation 
established under Article IX, Section 6 is subject to Headlee 
rollbacks. 1M As observed by the Attorney General: 
Thus, for example, if the property tax revenue of a township 
is generated by one of the 15 mills received from the annual 
allocation and the assessed valuation as equalized of 
property in the township increases by a greater percentage 
than the increase in the General Price Level, that one mill 
rate must be "rolled back" as provided in Const. 1963, art. 9, 
officially reported by the United States Department of Labor or its successor agency." 
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 33. 
129. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 31. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 6. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
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§ 31 unless the qualified electors in that townshW vote to 
restore that tax rate or vote for additional millage.! 
1063 
To illustrate further, if the state equalized value of property in a 
unit oflocal government is $10 million and rises to $11 million in the 
following year, exclusive of new construction, there would be a 10-
percent increase in the state equalized value. If the Consumer Price 
Index increases by only 6 percent, Section 31 requires that the 
property tax rate in the local governmental unit be reduced so that 
the tax levy on existing property increases by no more than 6 percent. 
Thus, if the total tax levy of the local governmental unit had been 
$200,000 in Year 1 (i.e., 20 mills x $10 million), in Year 2 the total tax 
levy on existing property may not exceed $212,000 ($200,000 x 1.06). 
Because the new state equalized value of existing property is now $11 
million and the maximum authorized rate of taxation is $212,000, the 
millage must be reduced to 19.273 mills ($212,000 maximum tax levy 
- $11 million state equalized value). Any new construction added to 
the tax rolls will be taxed at the rolled-back millage rate of 19.273 
mills. The Legislature has enacted an implementing statute for the 
Headlee rollback provision. It also enacted legislation in 1993 
providing for Headlee "rollups." The implementing legislation is 
discussed below in Section D of this Part. 
The last sentence of Section 31 excludes preexisting debt service 
taxes and ties into the Article IX, Section 6 provision authorizing the 
repayment of general obligation bonds with unlimited taxes. Mter 
the Headlee Amendment, voter approval is required before new 
general obligation bonds that are to be repaid with unlimited taxes 
can be issued. General obligation bonds are to be distinguished from 
limited tax general obligation (LTGO) bonds. A unit of local 
government may issue LTGO bonds without voter approval because 
they are paid from taxes the issuing unit of government is authorized 
to impose by law and other non-tax revenues the issuer may receive. 
The use of LTGO bonds has been criticized by the Headlee 
Commission as a subversion of the restrictions imposed on units of 
local government by the Headlee Amendment because they tie the 
hands of successor governments and erode the voting power of the 
people.!S6 
A. What Constitutes a "Local Tax" Under Section 31 ? 
The plain language of Article IX, Section 31 prohibits local 
governmental units from levying any new taxes or increasing any 
existing tax beyond the maximum authorized rate after December 23, 
135. See 1979-1980 Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. 389-90. 
136. See HEADLEE CoMM'N REpORT, supra note 4, at 54; See also Sessa v. County of 
Macomb, 559 N.W.2d 70,74-76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (Markman,J., concurring). 
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1978, unless local voters approve the levy.137 What if the Legislature 
enacts a new tax that directly benefits certain localities? Examples of 
such taxes enacted since the inception of Headlee include a city 
utility users tax that benefits Detroit;l88 an airport parking excise tax 
that largely benefits Wayne County;IS9 the convention and tourism 
marketing taxes;l40 and the Tiger Stadium tax, which authorizes an 
excise tax to be levied on hotel and motel accommodations. 141 
The basic focus in answering the question of what is a "local tax" 
under Section 31 is on the entity responsible for levying the tax. If the 
entity responsible for levying the tax is the Legislature, then the tax is 
a state tax for purposes of Section 31, even if the tax benefits 
localities. (However, such a state tax would then be subject to the 
limits of Article IX, Section 26.) The leading case on this issue is 
Airlines Parking, Inc. v. Wayne County.142 There, the Michigan Supreme 
137. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 31. 
138. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 141.801 (West 1994). The City Utility Users Tax 
was first enacted in 1972, thus predating the Headlee Amendment. It expired, but 
was reenacted in 1988. The revised version of this Act was successfully defended 
against a Section 31 challenge. See Taxpayers Allied For Constitutional Taxation v. 
Wayne County, 537 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. 1995). The Court concluded that because 
the Act was in effect at the time the Headlee Amendment was ratified, there could be 
no Section 31 violation. The Legislature responded to the litigation with the 
following statute, which was enacted in 1990: 
Sec. 8. This act is intended to eliminate the confusion surrounding the legal 
status of Act No. 198 of the Public Acts of 1970 resulting from an opinion of 
the attorney general regarding the validity of enactment of various public 
acts, OAG, 1987-1988, No 6438, P 80 (May 21, 1987) and a circuit court 
decision in the matter of Ace Tex Corp v Detroit rendered on February 2, 
1990 (Wayne County Circuit Court Case No. 88-807858-CZ), as to which an 
appeal is pending, and to resolve legislatively the issues raised by the appeal. 
Before that circuit court decision, the Legislature had been advised by the 
attorney general's office in May 1987 that legislative action was not 
necessary to authorize the collection of the city utility users tax after July 1, 
1988 under Act No. 198 of the Public Acts of 1970. In light of the circuit 
court decision of February 2,1990, which is presently on appeal, it appears 
that legislative action is advisable to clarify the authorization for and to 
ratify the collection of the tax. from July 1,1988, to authorize the continued 
collection of the tax, and to resolve legislatively the issues raised by appeal. 
The Legislature by enactment of this act intends to validate, ratify, and 
revive effective from July 1, 1988 a city utility users tax. This act is remedial 
and curative and is intended to revive and assure an uninterrupted 
continuation ·of the authority to collect a city utility users tax. The 
Legislature finds the city utility users tax was authorized by law on the date 
when section 31 of Article IX of the state constitution of 1963 was ratified. 
MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 141.1158 (West 1994) (footnotes omitted). 
139. [d. §§ 207.371-.383. 
140. [d. §§ 141.871-.880. 
141. [d. §§ 207.751-.759. 
142. 550 N.W.2d 490 (Mich. 1996). 
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Court held that the airport parking tax that is levied on parking 
facilities within 5 miles of Metropolitan Airpod43 is a state excise tax, 
and not a "local" tax. The court noted that "because it is at least 
theoretically possible that the state could levy a tax that was local in 
character, the entity imposing the tax in question may not 
conclusively resolve the Headlee question."I44 Notwithstanding that 
some local governmental units directly benefit from the tax (tax 
receipts are distributed to Wayne County monthly), the court 
nevertheless found that the tax is a state tax because it is styled as a 
state tax, structured as a state tax, serves a state purpose, was enacted 
by the Legislature, is collected by the state, and is distributed by the 
state.145 In contrast, the court added, local taxes are collected by local 
government, are administered directly by that local entity, and are 
spent by the local government according to local fiscal pOlicy.l46 
B. Local Tax Increases Necessitated By A Court Judgment 
If a local tax increase becomes necessary in order to satisfy a 
court judgment, is that tax increase outside the scope of Section 31's 
prohibitions? The RJA authorizes a court to order the levy of ad 
valorem property taxes to satisfy a money judgment entered against 
enumerated types of local governmental units.147 The RJA also 
provides generally that if a judgment is rendered against any 
municipality, the legislative body of that municipality may issue 
certificates of indebtedness or bonds of that municipality for the 
purpose of raising funds to pay the judgment.l48 That section was 
enacted before the effective date of the Headlee Amendment. 
Because the Headlee Amendment does not prevent the imposition of 
a tax or tax increase that was authorized prior to its effective date, a 
tax increase necessitated by a court judgment entered pursuant to the 
RJA arguably does not come within the restrictions of Section 31.149 
Moreover, because a court is not a unit of local government (as the 
latter term is defined in Article IX, Section 33), one federal court has 
concluded that there would be no violation of Section 31 if local taxes 
. d . d 150 were Increase to pay a court JU gment. 
143. Metropolitan Airport is the only airport in Michigan that fits the statutory 
definition of "a 'regional airport facility," i.e., "an airport that services 4,000,000 or 
more emplacements annually." MICH. COMPo LAwsANN. § 207.372 (h) (West 1994). 
144. AirportParking, Inc., 550 N.W.2d at 493. 
145. Id. at 493-94. 
146. Id. at 494. 
147. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.6093 (West 1994). 
148. Id. § 600.6097(1). 
149. See City of Detroit v. City of Highland Park, 878 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 
1995). 
150. See id. at 90. 
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On the other hand, the Michigan Court of Appeals has stated 
that while a unit oflocal government may issue LTGO bonds to pay a 
judgment levy without violating the last sentence of Section 31, it may 
not do so without voter approval if the bonds would cause the local 
governmental unit to exceed its authorized rate of taxation. lSI 
The Headlee Commission suggested that the RJA be amended to 
provide that a judgment levy be paid out of regular property tax levies 
or by issuing LTGO bonds (which are paid from existing tax 
revenues), but that in either case the judgment would at least be 
satisfied from funds that come from voter-approved taxing 
authority. 152 In this way, local governmental units will be forced to 
make the politically difficult budgetary choices that they may have 
been avoiding, which may have been the catalyst for the litigation 
that resulted in the judgment levy in the first place. 
C. What Constitutes a "New Tax" Under Section 31 ? 
As previously noted, in the absence of voter approval, Section 31 
prohibits units of local government from levying any new tax or from 
increasing the rate of an existing tax above the rate authorized by law 
or charter when Section 31 was ratified. A vexing issue is what 
constitutes a "new tax" as opposed to a "user fee" or "special 
assessment" under Section 31. Section 31 requires that a "new tax" 
receive voter approval. A "user fee" and a "special assessment," on 
the other hand, if not a "tax," are not subject to the same 
constitutional constraint. The Headlee Amendment does not define 
the term "tax," nor has the Legislature done so in implementing 
legislation.15s 
1. User Fees 
In Bolt v. City of Lansing,l54 the Michigan Court of Appeals 
considered a Section 31 challenge to a charge imposed by the City of 
Lansing on landowners for the cost of separating storm water runoff 
from raw sewage and treating the runoff. The plaintiffs claimed that 
the charge was a new tax that had not been approved by the voters 
and thus violated Article IX, Section 31. The City of Lansing 
151. Sma, 559 N.W.2d at 72. 
152. See HEADLEE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 37. 
153. Missouri's Hancock Amendment, which is modeled after the Headlee 
Amendment, uses the phrase "tax, license or fees." One commentator has 
concluded that "[t]he decisions defining the phrase 'tax, license or fees' have 
created a hodgepodge of results with no clear guiding standard." Joanne L. Graham, 
Toward a Workable Definition of "Tax, License, or Fees": Local Governments in Missouri and 
the Hancock Amendment, 62 UMKC L. REv. 821, 824 (1994). 
154. 561 N.W.2d 423 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). 
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maintained that the charge was a "user fee" and not subject to voter 
approval under Section 31. The court of appeals agreed with the city 
of Lansing, offering the following definition of "fee": "In general, a 
fee is exchanged for a sernce rendered or a benefit conferred, and 
there must be some reasonable relationship between the amount of 
the fee and the value of the sernce or benefit.,,155 
The court of appeals conceded that a charge for sewage disposal 
and treatment falls somewhere between two ends of a spectrum, with 
one end being an ad valorem property tax, and the other being a 
char~e for a city snow removal sernce that a landowner voluntarily 
uses. 6 Relying on Rippergerv. City of Grand Rapids, 157 a 1954 Michigan 
Supreme Court decision in which the court analogized a charge for 
sewage treatment to a user fee for furnishing water to city residents, 
the court of appeals concluded that the Lansing storm water runoff 
charge was a user fee and not a new tax. l58 
The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in the Bolt 
case and reversed the court of appeals decision.159 The court held the 
Lansing storm water sernce charge a tax for purposes of Article IX, 
Section 31 of the Headlee Amendment, and thus subject to a vote of 
the people. The court conceded that there is no bright-line test for 
distinguishing between a valid user fee and a tax that violates the 
Headlee Amendment.l60 The court noted that a user fee generally 
(1) serves a regulatory rather than a revenue-raising purpose, (2) is 
proportionate to the necessary costs of the sernce, and (3) is 
voluntary.161 The lack of correspondence between the Lansing 
stormwater runoff charges and the benefit conferred demonstrated 
to the court that the city of Lansing had failed to differentiate any 
particularized benefits to property owners, (upon whom the tax was 
imposed) from the general benefits conferred on the public.162 
2. SPecial Assessments 
Special assessments are widely used by local governmental units to 
defray the costs of a variety of local improvement projects. Special 
assessments rather than general property taxes are used to finance 
155. Bolt, 561 N.W.2d at 426 (citations omitted). 
156. Id. at 427. 
157. 62 N.W.2d 585 (Mich. 1954). 
158. Boll, 561 N.W.2d at 427. 
159. Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264 (Mich. 1998). 
160. Id. at 268. 
161. Id. at 269-70. 
162. Id. at 271. Compare County of Saginaw v. John Sexton Corp. of Michigan, 
591 N.W.2d 52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that a landfill surcharge qualifies as a 
regulatory fee for purposes of Section 31 of the Headlee Amendment because it is 
reasonably related to the costs involved in managing the county's disposal of solid 
waste). 
HeinOnline -- 76 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 1068 1998-1999
1068 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 76:1031 
such public imprQvements because such improvements dO' nQt 
benefit the general PQPulatiQn within the unit Qf IQcal gQvernment. 
AccQrdingly, it is apprQpriate that the direct beneficiaries Qf such 
. £ th 165 ImprQVements pay Qr em. 
TraditiQnally, special assessments are distinguishable from 
general prQperty taxes in at least three respects. First, general 
prQperty taxes are levied Qn real and tangible persQnal prQperty, 
whereas special assessments are levied Qnly Qn real property.l64 AlsO', 
real prQperty Qtherwise exempt frQm general property taxes are nQt 
ipso facto exempt frQm special assessments unless specifically 
exempted under the legislatiQn authQrizing the special assessment. ISS 
SecQnd, general prQperty taxes are levied acrQSS the bQard within 
the assessing jurisdictiQn to' defray the CQsts Qf gQvernment in 
general, whereas special assessments are levied Qnly within a special 
assessment district which is cQmprised Qf the land and imsrrovements 
that are specially benefited by the public imprQvements.1 HQwever, 
the Legislature has authQrized the creatiQn Qf special assessment 
districts that ar~ably benefit the general public, such as fQr 
b I . 167 am u ance servIce. 
Third, in theQry general prQperty taxes are levied Qn an ad 
valQrem basis, whereas special assessments are levied Qn the basis Qf 
frQntage Qr land area. l68 FQr example, a lakefrQnt owner with a 100-
fQQt frQntage WQuid pay theQretically twice as much fQr a dam 
installatiQn to' cQntrQI the lake level as WQuid a lakefrQnt Qwner Qn 
the same lake with 50 feet Qf frQntage. 
The Michigan Supreme CQurt has defined a "special assessment" 
as an impQsitiQn Qr levy uPQn property fQr the payment Qf the CQsts Qf 
public imprQvements which CQnfer a cQrresPQnding and special 
benefit uPQn the prQperty assessed.169 In Blake v. Metropolitan Chain 
Stores,170 the Supreme Court distinguished "special assessments" frQm 
"tax~s": "[a] special assessment is laid Qn the prQperty specially 
benefited by a IQcal imprQvement in prQPQrtiQn to' the benefit 
received fQr the purpQse Qf defraying the CQst Qf the imprQvement. ,,171 
163. See generally George Marti, Special Assessments, in 2 MICHIGAN MUNICIPAL LAw 
§§ 11.01-11.27 (Fred Steingold &John L. Etter eels., 1980). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. See MICH. CQMP. LAwsANN. § 333.20948 (West 1994). 
168. Marti, supra note 163, at §§ 11.14-11.16. 
169. SeeFluckeyv. City of Plymouth, 100 N.W.2d 486 (Mich. 1960). 
170. 225 N.W. 587 (Mich. 1929). 
171. Id. at 588. 
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The word "taxes" represents to the mind exaction to defray the 
ordinary expenses of the government and the promotion of the 
general welfare of the county. It is not generally understood as 
applying to improvements, levied upon property with a resultant 
benefit thereto to the amount thereof. l72 
A Michigan Supreme Court opinion that approached the tax vs. 
special assessment question with arguably the greatest precision and 
candor is St. Joseph Township v. Municipal Finance Committee.173 There, 
the court stated: 
While the word "tax" in its broad meaning includes both 
general taxes and special assessments, and in a general sense 
a tax is an assessment, and an assessment is a tax, yet there is 
a recognized distinction between them in that assessment is 
confined to local impositions upon property for the 
payment of the cost of public improvements in its 
immediate vicinity and levied with reference to special 
benefits to the property assessed. The differences between a 
special assessment and a tax are that (1) a special assessment can be 
levied only on land; (2) a special assessment cannot (at least in 
most States) be made a personal liability of the person assessed; (3) a 
special assessment is based wholly on benefits; and (4) a special 
assessment is exceptional both as to time and locality. The 
imposition of a charge on all property, real and personal, in 
a prescribed area, is a tax and not an assessment, although 
the purpose is to make a local improvement on a street or 
highway. A charge imposed only on property owners 
benefited is a special assessment rather than a tax 
notwithstanding the statute calls it a tax.174 
The Attorney General's Office has issued two opinions regarding 
the status of "special assessments" under Section 31. The first opinion 
addressed the status of special assessments, apportioned on an ad 
valorem basis, for police and fire protection, garbage collection, and 
street lighting. Citing Blake v. Metropolitan Chain Stores, the Attorney 
General concluded that if the charge is imposed only on those 
property owners who are benefited by the charge, then it is a special 
assessment and not a tax.175 The second opinion addressed the status 
of a special assessment district established to defray the cost of 
ambulance seIVice provided by a city. 176 The Attorney General 
concluded that since a municipality's ambulance seIVice must benefit 
172. Id. 
173. 88 N.W.2d 543 (Mich. 1958). 
174. Id. at 547-48 (citing Blake, 225 N.W.2d at 588)(quoting 1 COOLEY ON 
TAXATION § 31 (4m ed.) (emphasis added). 
175. See 1979-1980 Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. 389, 390. 
176. See 1979-1980 Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. 770. 
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all its residents, and since the property specially assessed does not 
receive a corresponding special benefit not provided the general 
public, such a "special assessment" would be a "tax" for purposes of 
Article IX, Section 31. 
The Headlee Commission recommended that the Legislature 
define the terms "special assessment" and "user fee" as follows: 
A "special assessment" is a payment for a physical 
improvement yielding a proportionate increase in the value 
of property, in which the revenue from the special 
assessment is used only for the costs of the improvement. 
A "fee for service" or "user fee" is a payment made for the 
voluntary receipt of a measured service, in which the 
revenue from the fees is used only for the service provided. 
As noted in the Headlee Commission Rep0z:t, local 
governmental units have increasingly resorted to nnposing 
mandatory user fees since ratification of the Headlee Amendment, 
including fees for mandatory recycling programs and fees for 
I h . 171 emergency te ep one servIce. 
D. The Assessed Value of Property as Finally Equalized 
In order to implement Headlee rollbacks, a millage reduction 
fraction has to be determined. Pursuant to Article IX, Section 31, if 
the aggregate values of property as determined by the assessing units 
of any county are more or less than 50% of true cash value, the State 
Tax Commission "equalizes" the county assessment by using a 
multiplier to add to or subtract from the aggregate assessed valuation 
of the county's taxable and real personal property. That process 
yields the state equalized value. The purpose of equalization is to 
adjust for differences in the modes of assessment among assessing 
units of government with the goal of achieving uniformity of property 
tax assessment at both the intra-county and intercounty levels.178 
177. HEADLEE COMM'N REpORT, supra note 4, at 26-29. 
178. See Allied Supermarkets, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 216 N.W.2d 755 (Mich. 
1974). Enacted in 1981, the Truth in Assessing Act, requires that when the state 
equalized valuation of a city or township exceeds its assessed valuation, the city or 
township must reduce its maximum authorized millage rate so that the amount of 
taxes collected does not exceed the amount that would have been collected had the 
city or township levied upon its assessed valuation. See MICHIGAN COMPo LAws ANN. § 
211.34 (West 1994). 
The Truth in Taxation Act, enacted in 1982, provides that a local unit of government 
shall not benefit from an increase in state equalized valuation unless the unit's 
governing body holds a public hearing designed to acquaint the public with the fact 
that the total tax dollars collected from existing authorized millage rate will be 
increased due to increases in the state equalized value of taxable property. Units of 
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In Michigan, there are six classes of real property and five classes 
of personal property.l79 The State Tax Commission equalizes the 
value of taxable property in each of the classifications. The assessed 
valuation of property as finally equalized for the separate classes is 
added together, and that sum is used in determining a "millage 
reduction fraction." This fraction is multiplied by the maximum 
millage rate authorized by the unit of local government in 
determining the tax rate for the local government. Section 
211.34d(7) of the Michigan Compiled Laws states the method by 
which the millage reduction fraction is calculated: 
A millage reduction fraction shall be determined for each 
year for each local unit of government. For ad valorem 
property taxes that became a lien before January 1, 1983, 
the numerator of the fraction shall be the total state 
equalized valuation for the immediately preceding year 
multiplied by the inflation rate and the denominator of the 
fraction shall be the total state equalized valuation for the 
current year minus new construction and improvements. 
For ad valorem property taxes that become a lien after 
December 31, 1982 and through December 31, 1994, the 
numerator of the fraction shall be the product of the 
difference between the total state equalized valuation for 
the immediately preceding year minus losses multiplied by 
the inflation rate and the denominator of the fraction shall 
be the total state equalized valuation for the current year 
minus additions. For ad valorem property taxes that are 
levied after December 31, 1994, the numerator of the 
fraction shall be the product of the difference between the 
total taxable value for the immediately preceding year 
minus losses multiplied by the inflation rate and the 
denominator of the fraction shall be the total taxable value 
for the current year minus additions. For each year after 
1993, a millage reduction fraction shall not exceed 1.180 
In O'Reilly v. Wayne County,181 the court of appeals considered a 
challenge to the millage reduction fraction methodology. The court 
concluded that separate millage reduction fractions need not be 
local government that levy one mill or less are exempted. See MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. 
§ 211.24e (West 1994). See also Richard D. Reed, Property Taxation, 2 MICHIGAN 
MUNICIPAL LAw §§ 10.01-10.24 (Fred Steingold &John L. Etter eds., 1980). 
179. The classes of real property are agricultural, commercial, developmental, 
industrial, residential, and timber cutover. The classes of taxable personal property 
are agricultural, commercial, industrial, residential, and utility. See MICH. COMPo 
LAwsANN. § 211.34c (West 1994). 
180. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 211.34d(7) (West 1994). 
181. 323 N.W.2d 493 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). 
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calculated for each class of progerty specified in Section 211.34c of 
the Michigan Compiled Laws.1 The court rejected the plaintiff's 
argument that the phrase in Section 31, "assessed valuation of 
property as finally equalized," must be interpreted to mean the 
assessed valuation of each separate class of property as finally equalized. 
The court found nothing in the language of Section 31 to suggest an 
intent to prohibit an increase of taxes within a class of property when 
such an increase results from equalization of assessments of that class 
with other classes at the same percentage of true cash value. ISS 
E. The Implementing Legislation for Headlee Rnllbacks and Rnllups 
The third sentence of Article IX, Section 31 requires that 
property tax millage rates be rolled back when assessed values, 
excluding new construction, exceed the rate of inflation. The 
implementing legislation provides a methodology and procedures for 
implementing Headlee rollbacks. 1M 
What if the rate of inflation exceeds the increase in property 
valuations? Can local taxing authorities reach back to prior years 
when property values exceeded inflation and "recapture" a portion of 
the increase in property values? A 1993 amendment to the 
implementing legislation prohibits Headlee "rollups" that would have 
allowed an increase in property taxes up to the "maximum 
authorized rate" if the rate of inflation exceeded the growth rate in 
property valuations. The 1993 amendment prohibits rollups without 
voter approval, thereby permanently reducing property taxes. 
Section 211.34d(16) of the Michigan Compiled Laws provides: 
Beginning with taxes levied in 1994, the millage reduction 
required by section 31 of Article IX of the state constitution 
of 1963 shall permanently reduce the maximum rate or 
rates authorized by law or charter. The reduced maximum 
authorized rate or rates for 1994 shall equal the product of 
the maximum rate or rates authorized by law or charter 
before application of this section multiplied by the 
compound millage reduction applicable to that millage in 
1994 pursuant to subsections (8) to (12). The reduced 
maximum authorized rate or rates for 1995 and each year 
after 1995 shall equal the product of the immediately 
preceding year's reduced maximum authorized rate or rates 
multiplied by the current year's millage reduction fraction 
and shall be adjusted for millage for which authorization 
182. Id. at 495-97. 
183. Id. at 498. 
184. See MICH. COMPo LAwsANN. § 211.34d (West 1994). 
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has expired and new authorized millage approved by the 
voters pursuant to subsections (8) to (12).185 
1073 
The Headlee Commission has concluded that the implementing 
legislation, although "extremely complex and difficult to 
understand,,,I86 nevertheless limits the increase in property tax 
revenue to the rate of inflation plus new construction. 
VIII. ARTICLE IX, § 32: TAXPAYER SUITS 
Section 32 of the Headlee Amendment gives taxpayers standing 
to challenge alleged violations of the Headlee Amendment and vests 
the Court of Appeals with original jurisdiction over such taxpayer 
suits. Section 32 provides: 
Any taxpayer of the state shall have standing to bring suit in the 
Michigan State Court of Appeals to enforce the provisions of Sections 
25 through 31, inclusive, of this Article and, if the suit is sustained, 
shall receive from the applicable unit of government his costs 
incurred in maintaining such suit. 187 
The apparent purpose of vesting the Court of Appeals with 
original jurisdiction over taxpayer suits was to expedite the judicial 
review process by eliminating the circuit court step. If this was the 
drafters' intent, it was misguided. As the experience from the 17-year 
long Durant litigation amply demonstrates, because the Court of 
Appeals is not a factfinding body, all disputed questions of fact are 
referred to a special master (i.e., a circuit court judge) 188, who makes 
findings of fact and recommendations to the Court of Appeals.189 
Other than the applicable standard of appellate review, the only 
differences between this process and the normal circuit court 
adjudicatory process followed by an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
seem to be matters of form rather than substance. 
The implementing legislation for Section 32 provides: 
Sec. 308a. (1) An action under section 32 of article 9 of the 
state constitution of 1963 may be commenced in the court 
of appeals, or in the circuit court in the county in which 
venue is proper, at the option of the party commencing the 
action. 
185. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 211.34d(16) (West 1994). 
186. HEADLEE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 4, at 34. 
187. MICH. CONSI'. art. IX, § 32. 
188. For example, in the Durant litigation, the Court of Appeals appointed 
special mast~rs, both of whom were circuit court judges, on two occasions. 
189. See MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 600.308a(5) (West 1994). See also MICHIGAN 
CoURT RULES 7.206(D) (3). 
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(2) The jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be invoked 
by filing an action by a taxpayer as plaintiff according to the 
court rules governing procedure in the court of appeals. 
(3) A taxpayer shall not bring or maintain an action under 
this section unless the action is commenced within 1 year 
after the cause of action accrued. 
(4) The unit of government shall be named as defendant. 
An officer of any governmental unit shall be sued in his or 
her official capacity only and shall be described as a party by 
his or her official title and not by name. If an officer dies, 
resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office during the 
pendency of the action, the action shall continue against the 
governmental unit and the officer's successor in office. 
(5) The court of appeals may refer an action to the circuit 
court or to the tax tribunal to determine and report its 
findings of fact if substantial fact finding is necessary to 
decide the action. 
(6) A plaintiff who prevails in an action commenced under 
this section shall receive from the defendant the costs 
incurred by the plaintiff in maintaining the action. l90 
Although the implementing legislation vests the circuit court 
and the Court of Appeals with concurrent jurisdiction over taxpayer 
suits, there are no reported cases in which a taxpayer initiated a 
Headlee Amendment challenge in circuit court.191 However, taxpayer 
lawsuits alleging not only Headlee Amendment violations but also 
other violations of state law must be filed in circuit court. l92 
A. The One-Year Limitations Period 
All taxpayer suits must be brought within one year after the 
cause of action accrues. The Michigan Supreme Court has upheld 
the statutory one-year limitations period as a reasonable restriction 
designed to protect the fiscal integrity of government units that 
190. fd. § 600.308A. 
191. Because local governmental units are not "taxpayers," the provisions of 
Section 32 are inapplicable to them. Claims by units of local government brought 
under the Headlee Amendment may be filed with the Local Government Claims 
Review Board, and from there to the circuit court. Id. § 21.246. 
192. See, e.g., Macomb County Taxpayers Ass'n v. L'Anse Creuse Public Schools, 
564 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1997) (where the plaintiff's complaint filed in circuit court 
alleged violations of both state law and of Article IX, Section 29). 
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might othenvise face the prospect of losing several years' worth of tax 
revenues.
195 
In connection with a challenge to the issuance of bonds, the 
Court of Appeals has held that if the taxpayer's challenge goes to the 
legality of a bond issue under the Headlee Amendment, that 
challenge is barred if brought after the bonds are issued, even if the 
taxpayer suit is filed within one year of the bond issuance.194 Known 
as the Bigger rule, 195 the rule protects the vested interests of third-party 
bondholders. In this connection, the Legislature has protected the 
interests of taxpayers by requiring publication of a notice of intent to 
bond, thereby giving taxpayers adequate notice and an opportunity 
to bring a Headlee challenge in the Court of Appeals.196 
B. Recovery of Fees and Costs 
Section 32 provides for the recovery of "costs" by a successful 
taxpayer in a Section 32 lawsuit. In Macomb County Taxpayers 
Association v. L ~nse Creuse Public Schools,197 the Michigan Supreme 
Court held that the term "costs" used in Section 32 includes 
reasonable attorney's fees. The court adopted the reasoning of the 
court of appeals in Durant v. Board of Education, 198 that the term "costs" 
include attorney fees: 
[L]itigation brought pursuant to § 32 can be complex and 
protracted. The financial outlay needed for maintaining a 
suit of this nature can be extremely burdensome and 
inhibitive. Attorney fees compose a substantial portion of 
such outlays. Without the ability to recoup all costs of 
maintaining an action to enforce the Headlee Amendment, 
including reasonable attorney fees, the average taxpayer 
could not withstand the financial obligation incurred as a 
result of exercising that taxpayer's right to bring suit. 
Accordingly, we conclude that, in ratifying the Headlee 
Amendment, "the great mass of people themselves" 
intended the term "cost" to include reasonable attorney 
fees. l99 
193. See Taxpayers Allied for Constitutional Taxation v. County of Wayne, 537 
N.W.2d 596 (Mich. 1995) (in which plaintiffs brought an action nearly ten years after 
the tax increase went into effect). 
194. Sessa, 559 N.W.2d at 73. 
195. See Bigger v. City of Pontiac, 210 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1973). 
196. SeeMICH. COMP.LAwsANN. § 123.958b(3}. 
197. 564 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1997). 
198. 463 N.W.2d 461 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). 
199. L~nse Creuse, 564 N.W.2d at 460 (quoting Durant v. Bd. OJ Educ., 463 
N.W.2d at 477-78). 
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The Supreme Court also consulted the drafters' notes which, 
although not authoritative, weigh in favor of a conclusion that "costs" 
includes attorney fees. The drafters' notes state that "costs" mean all 
expenses incurred in maintaining a taxpayer's lawsuit, including 
fIling, service, witness, and attorney fees. 2OO However, only individual 
taxpayers are entitled to recover their Section 32 costs; associations 
and governmental units are ineligible. 
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In summary, unfunded state mandates are prohibited under the 
Headlee Amendment. What constitutes a state mandate to local 
government, thereby triggering the provisions of Section 29 of the 
Headlee Amendment prohibiting such unfunded mandates to local 
government? The implementing legislation for Section 29 defines the 
term "state requirement" broadly to mean "a state law which requires 
a new activity or service or an increased level of activity or service 
beyond that required of a local unit of government by an existing 
law.,,201 The Michigan Supreme Court has held that requirements 
upon local government imposed under the Michigan Constitution 
are not a "state requirement" for purposes of Section 29 and 
unfunded state mandates.202 
If the state does require local governmental units to perform 
certain services, what costs incurred by local government must the 
state fund? Section 29 prohibits the State from reducing the state-
financed proportion of the necessary costs of any existing activity or 
service required of units of local government under state law.203 The 
Legislature has defined the term "necessary cost" to mean "the net 
cost of an activity or service provided by a local unit of government. 
The net cost shall be the actual cost to the state if the state were to 
provide the activity or service mandated as a state requirement, unless 
otherwise determined by the Legislature when making a state 
. ,,204 
reqwrement. 
If the Legislature underfunds units of local government in 
violation of Section 29, what is the remedy? The Michigan Supreme 
Court held in its 1997 Durant decision that the state is liable in 
damages if it violates Section 29, measured by the amount of 
underfunding of the state-mandated activities.205 The damage award 
200. L ~nse Creuse, 564 N.W.2d at 461. 
201. See supra note 93 and accompanying text 
202. See supra note 96 and accompanying text 
203. MICH. CONSf., art IX, § 29. See also Durant, 566 N.W.2d 272, 280 (Mich. 
1997). 
204. MICH. COMPo l.AwsANN. § 21.233(6) (West 1994). 
205. Durant, 566 N.W.2d 272,284-87 (Mich. 1997). 
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must be distributed to the units of local government adversely 
affected by the underfunding.206 The units of local government in 
turn distribute the monies in a manner they deem appropriate, 
including distributing the funds to local taxpayers.207 An award of 
interest on the damage lies within the discretion of the courts. 
Successful taxpayers are also entitled to an award of attorneys' fees.208 
If the Legislature enacts a tax that benefits local government, is 
that a "local tax" under the Headlee Amendment? This question 
captures one of the more troublesome issues that have arisen over 
the last twenty years. The Michigan Supreme Court has held that a 
tax is a state tax if it is styled as a state tax, is structured as a state tax, 
serves a state purpose, was enacted by the Legislature, is collected by 
the state, and is distributed by the state.209 In contrast, the court 
added, a tax is a local tax if it is collected by local government, is 
administered directly by that local entity, and is spent by the local 
government according to local fiscal pOlicy.210 The focus of the 
court's analysis is on whether the monies collected are subject to a 
state appropriate. Less important to the court is the fact that the 
beneficiary of the state appropriate is a specific unit of local 
government.211 Such state tax legislation for the benefit of local units 
of government arguably undercuts the requirement in Headlee of 
local voter approval of all new local taxes. 
In a closely related vein, are user fees and special assessments a 
"new tax" under the Headlee Amendment that require local voter 
approval? There is no legislation defining the terms "user fee" or 
"special assessment.,,212 In general, a fee is exchanged for a service 
rendered or a benefit conferred.21S A fee is distinguishable from a tax 
in that a fee provided there is some reasonable relationship between 
the amount of the fee and the value of the service or benefit.2J4 As 
previously stated, special assessments are distinguishable from 
general property taxes in at least three respects: 1) general property 
taxes are levied on real and tangible personal property, whereas 
special assessments are levied only on real property; 2) general 
property taxes are levied across the board within the assessing 
jurisdiction to defray the costs of government in general, whereas 
206. [d. 
207. [d. at 288-90. 
208. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
209. See Airlines Parking, Inc. v. Wayne County, 550 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Mich. 
1996). 
210. [d. 
211. [d. at 495. 
212. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
213. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
214. See Vernor v. Sec'y of State, 146 N.W. 338 (Mich. 1914). See also Merrelli v. 
City orst. Clair Shores, 96 N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 1959). 
HeinOnline -- 76 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 1078 1998-1999
1078 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LA W REViEW [Vol. 76:1031 
special assessment are levied only within a special assessment district 
which is comprised of the land and improvements; and 3) in theory 
general property taxes are levied on an ad valorem basis, whereas 
special assessments are levied on the basis of frontage or land area.215 
Again, as with state tax legislation that directly benefits local 
government, it is arguable that special assessments and user fees 
circumvent the Headlee Amendment requirements that all new local 
taxes be submitted for local voter approval. 
Finally, if a unit of local government does increase its millage 
rate without voter approval, doe it violate the Headlee Amendment? 
There may be a narrow set of circumstances where a local 
government can increase the millage rate without running afoul of 
Headlee. The Headlee Amendment does not prohibit millage 
increases without voter approval if the increase is within "the rate 
authorized by law" or "the maximum authorized rate." Therefore, for 
example, if a unit of local government was authorized by the voters to 
assess 18 mills before adoption of the Headlee Amendment, but it 
had only levied 16 of 18 mills so authorized, that unit is most likely 
free to assess the remaining two mills without voter approval. 
215. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. 
